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ractitioners require measures to evaluate how vulnerable
to diseases, especially for zoonoses (i.e. diseases transmitted
humans) given their pandemic potential. These measures
ble to support strategic and operational decision making
f resources. But, vulnerability is well defined for natural
blic health threats the concept remains undetermined.
ped new methodologies to: (i) quantify the impact of zoono-
the capacity of countries to cope with these diseases, and
se two measures (impact and capacity) into one overall
icator. The adaptive capacity is calculated from estimations
lity although the method can be adapted for diseases with
ality but high morbidity. As example, we focused on the
Nigeria and Sierra Leone to Lassa Fever and Ebola. We
ple analytical form that can be used to estimate vulnerability
ent spatial units of interest, e.g. countries or regions. We
ome populations can be highly vulnerable despite low
e finally outlined future research to more comprehensively
ility with the incorporation of relevant factors depictings part of the theme issue ‘Detection, forecasting and control
ease epidemics: modelling outbreaks in humans, animals
2’.
l consensus that the accelerating changes to Earth’s natural
ificant threats to global human health [1,2]. Identifying popu-
to these threats and assessing relevant mitigating strategies
t priorities for the scientific community, public health prac-
ional organizations such as the World Health Organization
ant national government agencies [3]. Although the term is
a loose way, vulnerability is a well-established concept in
e change and disaster risk reduction/management [4–6].
tegration of vulnerability in the control of infectious diseases
ew although the literature on the subject is growing, especially
t of climate change on vector-borne and food-/water-borne
Here, we focus on vulnerability to infectious diseases only.
isease vulnerability we refer to the ability of a community
o limit the spread of infectious diseases [3]. The definition
Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
mmons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
credited.
comprises two important concepts: disease impact and
adaptive capacity, i.e. the ability of the community to cope
with the disease. Below we will introduce an ‘operational
definition’ (i.e. a definition in terms of the procedure to
measure the variable of interest) for these concepts, but we
can anticipate that vulnerability to infectious diseases is
expected to be affected by changes in economic development
(e.g. change in healthcare infrastructures [3,13]), shift in socio-
cultural practices (e.g. changes in the funeral practices
in West Africa following the Ebola epidemics [14,15]),
variation in the demographic structure of a population (e.g.
increase in the proportion of older people [15]), trade and
travel patterns (e.g. incursion of Aedes albopictus in south
Europe due to trade of international tyres and lucky
bamboo (Dracaena braunii) [16,17] followed by outbreaks of
Chikungunya fever in north-eastern Italy in 2007 [18,19],
and autochthonous cases of dengue fever in 2010 in
France [20], Croatia [21] and Madeira in 2012 [22,23]),
and immunization-related phenomena (e.g. increasing
anti-vaccine movements [24]) etc.
This is not surprising, considering the impact of socio-
economic, environmental and ecological factors on infectious
diseases [25].
Ebola and Lassa fever are two illuminating examples of
the intricate interactions between disease vulnerability and
these broad drivers. Ebola and Lassa fever are zoonotic,
viral haemorrhagic fevers endemic in Central and West
Africa [26–28].
There are four pathogenic strains of Ebola virus (Zaire,
Sudan, Tai Forest and Bundibugyo) causing Ebola virus
disease (EVD) with a high case fatality rate in diagnosed
patients [29]. Fruit bats have been suggested to be the reser-
occasional, possible cases of human-to-human transmission
have been detected. It is important to emphasize that accord-
ing to [35] most cases have zoonotic origins, interspersed
with cases (about 20% although the estimate is affected by
uncertainty) ascribable to human-to-human transmission
arising from a few super-spreaders [35] (and therefore
ladder-like genetic structure of the phylogenetic tree is not
expected [39]). Another important aspect to be considered
in future studies is the role of asymptomatic cases (in about
80% of cases, symptoms are mild and are undiagnosed
[41]); samples from asymptomatic cases are, in general, not
included in the viral sequencing and this might affect the con-
clusions of phylogenetic analysis. The impact of Lassa fever
and Ebola as well as communities’ adaptive capacity, and
therefore their vulnerability to the diseases, are expected
to be affected by a wide range of environmental, biological,
ecological, socio-economic and political drivers. Examples
of such drivers for impact are demographic pressure,
human mobility, the practice of burning fields after harvest-
ing (driving M. natalensis towards villages), interaction
with wildlife via bush-meat hunting, seasonal crowding of
miners in dwellings etc. Examples of such drivers for adap-
tive capacity are income, infrastructure such as hospitals
and network of family support. Current approaches to the
assessment of population vulnerability to infectious diseases
suffer from limitations: they tend to be qualitative in nature,
they are usually structured in an ad hoc fashion based
on a particular threat, and their transparency is often
challenged when formulated as complex integrated assessment
models [42].
Here, we propose to address some of these limitations.
We focus on the formulation of a mechanistic model to
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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ARTICLE IN PRESSvoir of Ebola virus [30]; however, other candidates might
play an important role either as a reservoir or amplifying
host [28,31]. Socio-economics factors, e.g. bush meat hunting,
enhance opportunities for bat-to-human interactions, and
therefore spillovers. Behaviour, e.g. family interactions [32],
funeral practices [14] and healthcare responses [33] further
impact the epidemiology of the disease.
Lassa fever is caused by Lassa fever virus (LASV), an
enveloped RNA virus of the Arenaviridae. According to
one estimation [34], there are 300 000 cases of the disease
each year in West Africa, and some 3000 deaths, although
the calculation is highly uncertain. Since the identification
of LASV, human-to-human transmission has been documen-
ted in several nosocomial outbreaks ([35] and references
therein) leading to the initial perception that the virus
was both highly contagious and virulent [36]. Soon
after, however, its zoonotic origin was recognized and
Mastomys natalensis, one of the most common African
rodents, was identified as the reservoir of the virus [37]. As
the risk of nosocomial transmission was shown to be dramati-
cally reduced by using the simple barrier nursing method
([35] and references therein), the general consensus has
shifted towards the idea that the disease is primarily trans-
mitted by the Mastomys natalensis, with human-to-human
transmission limited to nosocomial transmission. In the last
few years, this narrative started to be challenged, with
more evidence of other host reservoirs [38] and further indi-
cation that human-to-human transmission might play an
important role [35]. This appears to be in contrast with
recent studies in Nigeria [39,40], according to which extensive
human-to-human transmission does not occur, although,rstb20180265—2/4/19—13:01–Copy Edited by: Not Mentionedmeasure vulnerability, the model is structured in a way that
the complex range of factors depicting local heterogeneities
can be incorporated into the model. The model can also be
dynamically updated as new information becomes available.
2. Material and methods
(a) Formal definitions
Vulnerability (V) is formally defined as the ratio of impact, I, and
adaptive capacity, AC (see [6,43] and references therein), i.e.
V ¼ I
AC
: (2:1)
In our context, we use the expected number of infected cases at time
t as operational definition of impact (representing the burden of
zoonotic diseases on a given population) and we use the expected
number of recovered cases out of all infected as operational definition
of adaptive capacity (representing the ability of such population
to cope with the impact of such disease). We distinguished two
situations: ‘severe cases’ and ‘general cases’. For the former, we
do not take into account individuals who naturally recover
from the disease as they do not require costly resource such as
hospitalization; we also made the underlying assumption that
health-seeking behaviour, resulting in hospitalization for which
we have data, occurs only in severe cases. Asymptomatic cases,
assumed to be not detected, are not taken into account in the
definition of vulnerability for severe cases. Individuals who natu-
rally recovered are taken into account in the definition of
vulnerability for general cases as the infection status will result
in loss of working days, personal cost for medicines etc. Here
and throughout the paper, we use the suffix ~sev and ~gen to
represent these situations.
role, MERS Coronavirus [45], or Lassa fever due to
human-to-human transmissions arising from super-spreading
cenario
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ARTICLE IN PRESS(b) Epidemiological scenarios
We consider the following epidemiological scenarios. The ration-
ale for this choice was the epidemiological relevance of these
scenarios and the natural mathematical progression, by extend-
ing the simplest model for pure spillover events to more
complex ones (table 1 and electronic supplementary material).
— Spillover events with no human-to-human transmission and no
variation in the number of susceptibles. This scenario exemplifies
a situation such as rare infections of pathogens with no or
limited human-to-human transmission, e.g. rabies virus infec-
tion, in a large pool of susceptibles for which changes in their
number are negligible.
— Spillover events with no human-to-human transmission and
depletion of susceptibles. The second scenario is when the
pool of susceptibles is limited, and infections from spillover
events result in either the death of the hosts or in its immu-
nity. As susceptibles are continuously depleted, the rate of
infections is reducing with time and the epidemics is self-
correcting [44]. This scenario exemplifies a situation such
as a long chain of spillover events in small, isolated com-
munities (e.g. Brucellosis in a community of pastoral
herders).
— Spillover events with human-to-human transmission and depletion
of susceptibles. The third scenario is similar to the situation
above with additional contribution of human-to-human
transmission. If the contribution of human-to-human trans-
mission is small, resulting in a basic reproductive number
less than one, the epidemiological scenario is referred to as
a stuttering chain. As a human infection triggers other
infections, the rate of infections due to human–human
transmission increases with time. In the absence of depletion
of susceptibles, the epidemic is self-exciting; otherwise, the
Table 1. Functional forms of vulnerabilities for a range of epidemiological s
‘general cases’; sufﬁxes ~disA and ~disB refer to diseases A and B; (x, y) iden
naturally, gH is the probability of recovering following some kind of interve
occur, fsuffixj is the rate at which individuals recover at time tj during the int
epidemiological scenarios
pure spillover events (no human to human transmission)
pure spillover events (no human to human transmission) during a
time T with change in the number of susceptibles
spillover events and human to human transmission, during a time T
multiple (two) diseases
extension to larger regions (e.g. country level)rstb20180265—2/4/19—13:01–Copy Edited by: Not Mentionedtwo mechanisms, self-exciting and self-correction, coexist
[44]. This scenario exemplifies a situation such as Ebola
for which human-to-human transmission plays a dominant
s. The sufﬁxes ~sev and ~gen represent the situations for ‘severe cases’ and
coordinates of the particular spatial unit; g is the probability of recovering
x is the proportion of detected cases; lsuffixj is the rate at which infections
[ [( j 2 1)t, jt] where t is the chosen time step.
erability
¼ 1(1x)gþxgH
1
gH
¼ 1(1x)gþxgH
1
gH
¼ 1(1x)gþxgH
1
gH
¼
P
l
disA
j þ
P
l
disB
j
[(1xdisA )gdisAþxdisAgdisAH ]
P
l
disA
j þ[(1xdisB )gdisBþxdisBg
disB
H ]
P
l
disB
j
xdisA
P
l
disA
j þxdisB
P
l
disB
j
[xdisAg
disA
H ]
P
l
disA
j þ[xdisBg
disB
H ]
P
l
disB
j
¼ L
Fgen
L
Fsev
P
l j(x, y) ; F
gen ¼Pfgenj (x, y); Fsev¼
P
fsevj (x, y).
gen ¼Pfgenj (x, y)events [35].
— Multiple (two) diseases. In general, diseases do not occur in iso-
lation and the simultaneous occurrence of multiple epidemics
is expected to have a large impact on communities vulner-
ability. For instance, due to the additional strain on
healthcare facilities and resources, as happened in Sierra
Leone when the Kenema government hospital Lassa
fever Team mobilized to establish Ebola virus surveillance
and diagnostic capabilities during the 2013–2016 Ebola out-
break [46]) and then were unable to respond to Lassa.
Interactions among infections may also affect the burden of
diseases. For example, several studies have indicated an associ-
ation between HIV infection and other sexually transmitted
diseases [47].
— Extension to larger regions (e.g. country level). The model is
formulated at the smallest spatial resolution, which is
dictated by ecological and epidemiological factors. For
example, for Lassa fever the smallest spatial unit is a region
of size comparable to the dispersal range ofMastomys natalensis
and where the assumption of uniform mixing (everyone is in
contact with each other) is valid. In some instances, it may
be more relevant, however, to know the vulnerability of a
larger geographical region, region or administrative unit
such as a province or a country. The underlying model
(based on a Poisson processes) can be readily extended to
measure vulnerability at larger scale (as the sum of two inde-
pendent Poisson distributed random variables is still a Poisson
random variable).
(c) Modelling approach
Based on this definition (2.1) and building on a mathematical
model for spillover events (as Poisson processes) and stuttering
chain (as Hawkes processes) [44], we derived analytical expressions
for vulnerability for the epidemiological scenarios as described
above. Below we show the mathematical derivation for the
simple case of vulnerability to diseases with no human-to-human
transmission. Mathematical derivations of the more complex
situations follow similar steps and are presented in the electronic
supplementary material. Following [44], spillover events can be
treated as a Poisson process, and complex drivers are incorpor-
ated in the functional form of the rate, l, of the Poisson
process. More precisely, in the simplest scenario the human
population is uniformly subjected to random and independent
(direct or mediated) contacts with the animal reservoir. Only a
fraction of these contacts, equal to the infection prevalence of
the reservoir, are a potential source of infection. We also
distinguish the detected infections from the undetected ones.
Accordingly, we assume:
l ¼ xNHhR(NR)PrR(NR)xR þ (1 x)NHhR(NR)PrR(NR)xR
¼ NHhR(NR)PrR(NR)xR,
(2:2)
where x is the proportion of detected cases; NH is the human
population size of the geographical unit of interest, e.g. total
number of people in a village; hR(NR) is a measure of exposure;
PrR(NR) is the prevalence of the infected reservoir; both exposure
and prevalence are expected to depend on the reservoir
population size NR; xR is a parameter combining two complex
mechanisms: the ability of the reservoir to excrete a suitable
dosage of the agent/pathogen/hazard and the human response
to it. We refer to this parameter as infection-response efficiency.
We assumed that all detected cases results in some intervention.
Similarly, we assume that the probability of a person recovering,
i.e. the adaptive capacity AC, is given by a Poisson process with
rate fsev or fgen depending on weather we are considering the
situation for severe cases or general cases. Namely:
Adaptive Capacity for severe cases. In this case, the rate fsev(t)
of the Poisson process is given by
diseases with high mortality, the probability of recovering due
to intervention can be inferred as
gH ¼
D F
D
, (2:7)
where D is the cumulative number of cases detected during a
certain time T and F is the cumulative number of fatal cases
out of the detected ones during the time T. Here, we consider
any non-fatal cases as recovered, hence D 2 F represents the
number of recovered cases at time T and gH is the proportion
of recovered cases, out of all detected cases, at time T.
The method could be adapted to diseases with low or no mor-
tality but high morbidity, for instance by estimating the
probability of recovering due to intervention as gH ¼ Streat/D,
where Streat is the cumulative number of cases during a time T
resulting in a successfully medical treatment. Confidence interval
around vulnerability measures was calculated based on a Pois-
son log-linear model for the ratio of two independent Poisson
rates [48]. The probability of natural recover could be obtained
by survival/mortality data if information on the undetected,
including asymptomatic, cases are available (see [41]). The prob-
ability of detection x can be inferred by the literature,
surveillance data or other modelling exercises.
Alternatively, the relevant parameters, for example, the prob-
ability of recovering following intervention gH, could be further
modelled using other proxies such as number of hospital beds,
income etc.
(d) Case studies and data
We studied the vulnerability of Sierra Leone to Ebola, and the
vulnerability of Sierra Leone and Nigeria to Lassa fever. We
used data (number of laboratory confirmed cases and number
of deaths) from the 2013–2016 Ebola epidemics in Sierra
Leone, Lassa fever epidemic in Sierra Leone during 2008–2012
and from the 2017–2018 Lassa fever epidemic in Nigeria. Data
were extracted from publicly available repositories [49–51] and
from Kenema Government hospital in Sierra Leone (available
from [35]).
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ARTICLE IN PRESSfsev ¼ xlgH, (2:3)
where gH is the probability that an infected person seeking inter-
vention (and therefore drawn from the expected number of
detected, spillover cases xl) recovers following some kind of
intervention e.g. treatment, hospitalization, other forms of health-
care aid. Accordingly, the quantity xlgH represents the expected
number of recovered cases (as a proportion of detected, spillover
cases xl) cases per time unit.
Adaptive Capacity for general cases. In this case, the rate fgen(t)
of the Poisson process is given by
fgen ¼ (1 x)lgþ xlgH, (2:4)
where g is the probability that a person naturally recovers
without intervention. For the severe cases scenario, the impact
I is represented by the fraction of detected infected cases xl
and the vulnerability is
Vsev ¼ I
AC
¼ xl
fsev
¼ 1
gH
: (2:5)
In the general cases scenario, the impact I is represented by the
total number of infected cases l and the vulnerability is
Vgen ¼ I
AC
¼ l
f
¼ 1
(1 x)gþ xgH
: (2:6)
Thus, the method requires estimates of the (i) probability of
recovering following intervention gH (ii) probability of recover-
ing naturally g and (iii) probability of detection x. For arstb20180265—2/4/19—13:01–Copy Edited by: Not Mentioned3. Results
(a) Some simple expressions for vulnerability
Table 1 shows the analytical expressions of vulnerability for
the general and severe situations for some key epidemiologi-
cal scenarios. Accordingly, we showed that vulnerability
can be simply estimated as the inverse of the probability of
recovering. For the severe situation, this simply reduces to
one parameter, gH, representing the probability of recovering
following intervention. For the general situation, the prob-
ability of recovering is a linear (additive) combination of
the fraction of detected cases  the probability of recovering
following intervention and the fraction of undetected
cases  the probability of natural recovery, g. The functional
form of vulnerability is not dependent on the number of
diseased cases; this is strictly valid when the system under
consideration (e.g. a country) is able to cope with any
magnitude of disease burden and the probability of recover-
ing is not affected by the number of diseased cases. When the
number of diseased cases overcomes a certain threshold,
there will no longer be beds in hospital and/or medical
personnel available. In this case, the functional form of
vulnerability would still scale as the inverse of the probability
of recovering, but this would be a function of the number of
diseased cases, i.e. gH! gH(l), rather than a simple constant.
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tyFigure 1. Time-dependent vulnerability to Lassa fever for Sierra Leone (a) and Ni
uous b
erved c
de estim
o avoidIn the co-presence of multiple diseases, the analytical
expression for vulnerability becomes a function incorporating
(i) the sum of the two disease cases, (ii) the probabilities of
recovering and (iii) the fraction of detection for the different
diseases. In this situation, the functional form of vulnerability
depends on the number of cases of the two specific diseases,
with relevant parameters (e.g. proportion of detection
and probability of recovering for the two diseases) being
weighted by factors representing the relative burden of dis-
ease A and disease B (electronic supplementary material).
This reflects the fact that the diseases can have a differential
effect on impact and adaptive capacity (for instance, when
a country can cope better with one disease rather than the
other). As above, in a more general situation, the probability
of recovering should be substituted with the adequate
function of the number of cases for both diseases.
Extension of the model at larger spatial resolution also
leads to a transparent expression for vulnerability, which is
simply the ratio of the overall impact (i.e. the sum of the
impacts for each spatial unit) and overall adaptive capacity
(i.e. the sum of the adaptive capacity for each spatial unit).
Finally, it is important to emphasize that the terms in
the rate l (e.g. the reservoir population size NR and the
prevalence of the infected reservoir PrR(NR)) can be seasonal
(leading to an in-homogeneous Poisson process) and
stochastic (leading to Cox processes, and if the rate l is a
ations; grey area: 95% confidence interval for the severe situations; contin
vulnerability for severe situation based on the information that the obs
fever is 15% [41], i.e. V ¼ 100/(100 2 15); black dashed-line: overall, cru
rate is 1% [41], i.e. V ¼ 100/99. Data from the first month were removed t
and not detected.rstb20180265—2/4/19—13:01–Copy Edited by: Not Mentionedgamma-distributed variable, the Cox process is described
by a negative binomial distribution [44]). Similar consider-
ation can be applied to the adaptive capacity and in turn to
the vulnerability, i.e. estimations of vulnerability are expected
to be seasonal and stochastic.
(b) Vulnerability to Lassa fever and Ebola in Nigeria
and Sierra Leone
Figure 1 shows the vulnerability to Lassa Fever during the
2017–2018 epidemic in Nigeria, and for 2008–2012 in
Sierra Leone. Estimations for both the general and severe situ-
ations are presented. For Nigeria, vulnerability decreases
with time reaching the asymptotic values between 1.25 and
1.5 (severe situation) and between 1.25 and 1.3 (general situ-
ation). Note that according to our definition, a vulnerability
equal to 1 means that all infected cases recover. In Sierra
Leone, vulnerabilities increase with time after 2010 and
tend to be slightly higher than the corresponding values for
Nigeria. The vulnerabilities for the general situation tend to
be lower than those for the severe situation. The vulnerability
to Lassa fever in Nigeria shows a marked decrease during the
time of the epidemics compared with the vulnerability for
Sierra Leone (1). The decreasing trend in Nigeria is largely
driven by the fact that the number of fatal cases decrease
with time, although the number of detected cases also
Jan 
2018
July 
2018
te
geria (b) during recorded epidemics. Continuous dark red line: severe situ-
lue line: general situation; orange dashed-line: overall, crude estimate of
ase-fatality rate among patients hospitalized with severe cases of Lassa
ate of vulnerability for general situation based on an overall case-fatality
potential death cases associated with infections occurred the month before
increases. The reasons are not entirely clear, but we suspect
that this is due to the fact that Lassa fever in Sierra Leone
might not prompt any exceptional response (being hyperen-
demic in that area), while in Nigeria the outbreak triggered
a stronger response, especially following the 2013–2016
Ebola outbreak. The uncertainty decreases with time, reflect-
ing the increasing number of detected cases and of fatal
cases out of the detected ones, which reduces the uncertainty
in the estimation.
For Ebola in Sierra Leone (figure 2), we consider only the
severe situation, as no information on detection and the prob-
ability of natural recovery were available to the authors
(vulnerability for the general case can be readily estimated
as soon as these data become available). Vulnerability
increased sharply during the 2015–2016 epidemic reaching
a higher value than that estimated for Lassa fever. To under-
stand these patterns, it is instructive to look at the number
of detected and recovered cases; as can be seen in figure 3,
the number of recovered cases was, in general, higher in
January–March 2015 compared to the value after July
2015, explaining the larger vulnerability after July 2015.
The reasons for the larger number of recovered cases in
January–March 2015 are not clear. Figure 4 shows the
vulnerability of the different Nigerian administrative states
to the Lassa epidemic in 2017–2018; the figure also shows
the burden of disease. The most vulnerable states are not
necessarily those with higher impact, for instance the state
of Plateau is the most vulnerable despite the relatively low
burden of disease.
4. Discussion
Vulnerability is a complex concept and estimating its value is
a highly dimensional problem largely affected by a diverse
range of cultural/anthropological, environmental, political
and socio-economic drivers [52,53]. Examples of these factors
are perception of the disease, urbanization, deforestation,
infrastructures and service disruption, new technologies, cli-
mate, weather, land use, resources to implement necessary
programmes, etc. This poses enormous challenges to measure
and predict vulnerability and to its understanding.
To overcome this problem, we propose to focus on estab-
lished definitions of impact, adaptive capacity and therefore
vulnerability. Accordingly, the impact was measured as
the number of infected cases and adaptive capacity as the
number of recovered out of the diseased cases. An important
advantage of this approach is the simplicity of the functional
forms of vulnerability, especially when only one disease is
considered. Another important benefit is that the expressions
for vulnerabilities, for both general and severe situations, are
identical for several different scenarios e.g. pure spillover and
spillover with human-to-human transmission. It is important
to recognize, however, that the formulation of the model, and
thus the specific functional form of vulnerability, depends on
the epidemiological scenario and specific problem that we
want to address. Guidance from other approaches such
as expert opinion [6,10] and participatory research [54,55]
would be highly beneficial in identifying the scenario of
interest and critically scrutinize the analytical expression
for vulnerability.
The analytical expressions for vulnerabilities for the
relevant scenarios are the key result from this work. We
applied our analytical framework on Lassa fever and Ebola.
As direct evidence on key parameters was not available, we
inferred them from data. As an illustrative example, the prob-
ability of recovering following intervention gH was crudely
estimated from the cumulative number of detected and fatal-
ity cases. We would recommend however, more detailed
analyses [56] to estimate the probabilities of recovering.
Our approach can produce a time-dependent estimation
of vulnerability as the epidemics progress (as shown in
figures 1 and 2). An important difference between vulner-
ability to Lassa fever and Ebola is the observed temporal
trend of the estimations. In contrast with that to Lassa
fever, vulnerability to Ebola increases sharply as the epi-
demics progress followed by a plateau. It is also important
to note that the accuracy of estimates of vulnerability is
expected to increase towards the end of the epidemics, as
the estimation of the probability of recovering following
intervention is more robust due to the larger samples.
(a) Future development
Future development will extend our simple models to incor-
porate relevant factors describing local heterogeneities to
identify potential associations with the estimated vulner-
ability. For instance, the probability of recovery from
diseases due to intervention could be linked with indicators
such as proximity to healthcare facilities, number of hospital
beds and others. In turn, these factors could be associated
with more general socio-economic factors such as literacy
rate, poverty rate, government expenditure on health and
so on. Identifying the relevant indicators and factors poten-
tially affecting vulnerability is not a trivial task, especially
as these factors are often correlated ([57] and references
therein). Nevertheless, the formal incorporation of these
local heterogeneities in our analytical framework would
allow prioritization of vulnerability predictors and support
targeted investments. Institutions like the WHO require
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Figure 2. Time-dependent vulnerability to Ebola for Sierra Leone during
recorded epidemics. Continuous dark red line: severe situations; grey area:
95% confidence interval for the severe situations. Data from the first
month were removed to avoid potential death cases associated with infec-
tions occurred the month before and not detected.
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